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Abstract
The European Union (EU) often conditions preferential access to its market on compliance with
Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs), including human rights and labor and environmental
standards. In this paper, we first systematically document the coverage of NTPOs across the
main tools of EU trade policy: its (association and non-association) trade agreements and
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs. We then discuss the extent to which the EU
can use these tools as a “carrot-and-stick” mechanism to promote NTPOs in trading partners.
We argue that, within trade agreements, the EU has limited scope to extend or restrict tariff
preferences to “reward good behavior” or “punish bad behavior” on NTPOs, partly because
multilateral rules require members to eliminate tariffs on substantially all trade. By contrast,
GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis, and can thus more easily be extended or
limited, depending on compliance with NTPOs. Our analysis also suggests that the commercial
interests of the EU inhibit the full pursuit of NTPOs in its trade agreements and GSP programs.
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1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) is one of the biggest players in world trade and often exploits its com-
mercial power as a diplomatic tool.1 It has been argued that preferential access to the EU market,
sometimes combined with financial aid and economic cooperation, is “the principal instrument of
foreign policy for the EU” (Sapir, 1998, p. 726).
The EU conducts its external relations, including trade relations, with the stated purpose of
promoting its values. This goal has been made official in the Treaty of Lisbon, notably Article 21
(1), which states:
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in
the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.
Art. 21 (3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) explicitly encompasses trade as part of the
action of the EU “on the international scene”, and trade policy must consequently “be guided” by
EU values. For this reason, the EU often conditions preferential trade access to its market to the
achievement of Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs), such as sustainable development, human
rights, and good governance.2 In response to increasing calls from the European Parliament and
civil society, the new von der Leyen Commission has promised to strengthen the use of trade tools
in support of such NTPOs.3
The purpose of the paper is twofold. First, we systematically document the coverage of NTPOs
across the main tools of EU preferential trade policy: trade agreements – which we distinguish
between association and non-association agreements – and the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP). Second, we examine the extent to which the EU can use these trade policy instruments as a
1The EU is the world’s largest exporter of manufactured goods and services and is itself the biggest export market
for around 80 countries. Together, its current 28 members account for 16% of world imports and exports. See
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-position-in-world-trade/.
2In general, conditionality is defined as granting benefits to a country subject to the beneficiary meeting certain
conditions (Kishore, 2017) or as a mechanism to bring about policy reforms or impose policies that the beneficiary
country would not voluntarily choose (Morrissey, 2005).
3See Mission Letter of then Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyen to Phil Hogan, Commissioner-
designate for Trade as of 10 Sept 2019: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/
mission-letter-phil-hogan-2019_en.pdf.
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“carrot-and-stick” mechanism to promote NTPOs in partner countries. It should be stressed that
our goal is to examine whether the EU can potentially use conditionality in tariff preferences to
promote NTPOs. We do not study outcomes, i.e. whether EU trade agreements and GSP programs
actually had any impact on such objectives.
To examine the coverage of NTPOs in trade agreements, we use data from the Design of Trade
Agreements (DESTA) project. Because of differences in rationale and legal status, it is useful to
group NTPOs according to their political and economic objectives. Political NTPOs include civil
and political rights as well as security issues, whereas economic NTPOs encompass economic and
social rights and environmental protection.4
We show that political NTPOs related to human rights and security are more prevalent in
association than non-association agreements and their coverage decreases with the size of the trading
partner. This suggests that, when negotiating association agreements with neighboring countries,
the EU is mostly driven by political motives: it offers preferential access to its market in exchange
for close political co-operation (possibly towards future membership). Non-association agreements
are instead more focused on economic NTPOs related to labor and environmental standards and
the coverage of these provisions increases with the size of the trading partner. This suggests that
the inclusion of economic NTPOs in trade agreements is mostly driven by commercial motives
and a desire by the EU to ensure a “level playing field” between domestic producers and foreign
competitors.
We also document the coverage of NTPOs in the GSP programs of the EU. Over the years, the
EU has introduced in its GSP regulations provisions aimed at pursuing both political and economic
NTPOs. These provisions make GSP eligibility conditional on respect of core principles set out in
international conventions (e.g. on human rights, labor and environmental protection, fight against
terrorism and drug trafficking).
We then examine the extent to which the EU can use tariff preferences – in its trade agreements
and GSP programs – as a “carrot-and-stick” mechanism to incentivize trading partners and achieve
NTPOs. We argue that tariff preferences offered through trade agreements are not an effective
4Civil and political rights mainly refer to the protection of human rights, democratic institutions, rule of law,
good governance, and corruption problems. Security issues deal with national security, drug trafficking, and the fight
against terror. Economic and social rights broadly relate to labor standards, social protection, and development.
Environmental protection includes objectives such as the protection of wildlife, reduction of air pollution, waste
management, and forest protection.
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tool to promote compliance with NTPOs. The key reason for this ineffectiveness is that EU
trade agreements are subject to the requirements imposed by Article XXIV of the GATT/WTO,
which stipulates that member countries should eliminate tariffs and other restrictive measures on
“substantially all the trade.” Given that tariffs must be eliminated reciprocally across the board,
the EU cannot easily extend or restrict preferential access to its market to “reward good behavior”
or “punish bad behavior” on NTPOs.5
In principle, the EU can trigger the “essential elements” clause in case of severe NTPOs vi-
olations by a trading partner, leading to the suspension or termination of the trade agreement.
However, this clause only applies to severe violations of political NTPOs (related to human rights,
democracy, the rule of law, and security). Moreover, in the few cases in which the EU has activated
the “essential elements” clause, it has never suspended or terminated the agreement. This may
partly be due to the fact that this “stick” is too drastic: given the reciprocal nature of a trade
agreement, its suspension or termination can be extremely costly, not only for the trading partner,
but also for the EU.
When it comes to its GSP programs, we argue that the EU can more easily condition preferential
access to its market to compliance with NTPOs by the trading partners. The key difference is that
GSP preferences are offered on a unilateral basis, which affords more leeway in using conditionality
by preference-granting countries.
The EU can reward GSP members that make progress towards NTPOs by offering lower tariffs
and/or a broader product coverage (positive conditionality). For example, since 2014 the Philip-
pines is a beneficiary of the GSP+ program. This special incentive arrangement for Sustainable
Development and Good Governance grants developing countries full removal of tariffs on two thirds
of all product categories, conditional on their ratification of and compliance with core international
conventions on human rights, labor and environmental protection.6
Conversely, in case of violations of NTPOs, the EU can punish the trading partner by suspending
part or all of its GSP preferences (negative conditionality). For example, in 2010 the EU withdrew
5The EU may have more leeway to nudge trading partners towards compliance with its NTPOs when the agreement
extends cooperation beyond trade policy. This is typically the case in association agreements, in which the EU can
make financial or technical assistance conditional on NTPOs. Whether these objectives can be enforced by non-trade
policy instruments is beyond the scope of this article.
6As a result of the upgrade, the number of products which the Philippines could export at zero tariff increased
from 2,442 under standard GSP to 6,274 under GSP+.
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Sri Lanka from its GSP+ program. This decision was based on the findings of an investigation
by the Commission that identified shortcomings in the implementation by Sri Lanka of three UN
human rights conventions (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention
Against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, respectively).
Although GSP programs can in principle be an effective tool to promote NTPOs in trading
partners, the EU has only punished NTPO violations on a few occasions, mostly in the case of severe
violations of human rights in small developing countries. Commercial motives may explain why
similar violations in larger developing countries have not been punished. We argue that monitoring
and implementation of GSP conditionalities would need to be more consistent and rules-based if
the new EU Commission truly wanted to use trade policy to promote NTPOs.
In line with previous studies (see Poletti and Sicurelli (2018) and Meissner and Mckenzie (2018),
among others), our analysis suggests that EU trade policies are driven by two often conflicting goals:
promoting European values and pursuing the commercial interests of EU members.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section ?? and ??, we briefly trace the evolution of NTPO
provisions in EU trade agreements and GSP programs, respectively. In Section ??, we focus on
conditionality clauses in EU trade agreements and GSP programs, comparing the extent to which
these trade tools can be used to promote NTPOs. Section ?? concludes.
2 NTPOs in EU Trade Agreements
At present, the EU has in place the largest trade network in the world, with 42 trade agreements
fully in force or provisionally applied.7 These trade agreements are listed in Table ?? in Appendix A.
All trade agreements covering goods are notified at the WTO under GATT Article XXIV and
take the form of free trade agreements (FTAs), with the exception of the ones with Andorra, Turkey,
and San Marino, respectively, which are customs unions.8 Table ?? also distinguishes whether these
trade agreements are part of an association agreement.
Association agreements are a very important instrument used by the EU in its external policy,
7The European Community (EC) Treaty is excluded. The European Economic Area agreement (EEA) and the
EU agreements with Iceland, Norway and Switzerland-Liechtenstein are considered separately. Trade agreements
currently under negotiation (e.g. with Mercosur, India, Australia, New Zealand) are excluded from the analysis.
8Some agreements are both FTAs and EIAs (Economic Integration Agreements) covering not only goods, but also
services. These agreements are notified at the WTO under GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V.
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as they “establish a legal and institutional framework for the development of privileged relations
involving close political and economic cooperation” (Van Elsuwege and Chamon, 2019, p. 9). The
legal basis for association agreements is Article 217 TFEU. If a trade agreement is negotiated under
this article then in Table ?? and throughout our analysis we classify it as an association agreement.9
During the last decades, trade agreements have not only increased in number but have also
become “deeper.” They often include provisions related to NTPOs. To describe the coverage of
NTPOs in EU trade agreements, we use the dataset on their legalization constructed by Lechner
(2016) in the context of the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) project. The use of this dataset
is motivated by two reasons. First, it provides nuanced measures of the coverage of NTPOs instead
of simply coding whether or not they are included in an agreement. Second, the database covers
a wide range of agreements, including the most recent ones.10 While the degree of legalization is
not a measure of enforcement per se, it captures variation in the degree of commitment towards
NTPOs by the EU and its trading partners.
The concept of legalization, introduced by Abbott et al. (2000) and applied by Lechner (2016)
to NTPOs in trade agreements, is based on three criteria: obligation, precision, and delegation.
Obligation refers to the extent to which trading partners make commitments indicating the intent
to be legally bound. Precision refers to the degree to which the rules that define the conduct
required, authorized or proscribed for trading partners are unambiguous. Delegation measures to
what extent third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules,
to resolve disputes, and possibly make further rules. A legalization score is computed aggregating
these three dimensions for each category of NTPOs. The score ranges from “ideal” legalization,
where the three dimensions are maximized, to the complete absence of legalization.11
9The conclusion of association agreements was already foreseen in the first EU Treaties. According to van El-
suwege and Chamon (2019), this provision has not undergone substantial modifications, except for certain procedural
amendments. The current Article 217 TFEU corresponds to the former Articles 310 and 238 TEC (Treaty establishing
the European Community).
10The World Bank also collects data on the content of trade agreements. The Deep Trade Agreements database
1.0 compiled by Hofmann et al. (2017) based on the methodology of Horn et al. (2010) only analyzes whether
various NTPOs are included in the agreement or not and does not cover the most recent agreements concluded by
the EU. The Deep Trade Agreements database by Mattoo et al. (2020) provides nuanced measures, but does not
cover NTPOs related to civil and political rights and security and does not include the most recent trade agreements.
11The method used to compute the degree of legalization for each category of NTPOs in trade agreements is
detailed in Lechner (2016). The maximum possible legalization score varies across the four categories of NTPOs,
depending on the issues specific to each category included in the analysis: 31 for civil and political rights, 37 for
economic and social rights, 33 for environmental protection, and 25 for security. Therefore, the maximum possible
overall legalization score per agreement is 126.
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Lechner (2016).
In Figure ??, we analyze the evolution of NTPOs in trade agreements negotiated by the EU
during the last five decades, based on the overall legalization scores. The figure shows that NTPOs
have gained prominence during the last two decades: all the agreements with the highest overall
legalization scores (above 40) have all been signed after the Treaty of Lisbon (e.g. with Georgia,
Moldova, Ukraine, Canada, Japan, Vietnam).
Combining Figure ?? and Table ??, it is apparent that the highest legalization scores correspond
to association agreements with small trading partners (e.g. Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) as well as
to FTAs with larger partners (e.g. Canada, Japan, Vietnam). To further explore the driving forces
behind the high scores of these agreements, we decompose in Table ?? the overall score of each
trade agreement by type of NTPOs and by type of agreement (association or non-association).
The most recent association and non-association agreements have similar overall legalization
scores, yet the composition of these scores is different across the two types of agreements. In the case
of association agreements, political NTPOs (civil and political rights and security issues) prevail.
In the case of non-association agreements, the high overall legalization scores are mainly driven by
economic NTPOs (economic and social rights and environmental protection). As discussed below,
this systematic difference reflects different motives to negotiate trade agreements: the desire for
close political co-operation (possibly towards future membership) is a key motive in association
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agreements, while market access is the primary rationale in non-association agreements.
Table 1
Degree of legalization of NTPOs in EU trade agreements




European Economic Area (EEA) (1992) 2 2 6 4 14
EU - Israel (1995) 6 5 7 5 23
EU - Tunisia (1995) 5 8 7 3 23
EU - Turkey (1995) 2 2 3 2 9
EU - Morocco (1996) 5 8 10 3 26
EU - Jordan (1997) 7 6 6 4 23
EU - South Africa (1999) 8 4 8 5 25
EU - Egypt (2001) 8 7 8 5 28
EU - North Macedonia (2001) 7 10 10 6 33
EU - Algeria (2002) 6 8 7 6 27
EU - Chile (2002) 11 5 10 9 35
EU - Lebanon (2002) 5 7 7 4 23
EU - Albania (2006) 8 11 8 10 37
EU - Montenegro (2007) 11 12 8 8 39
EU - Bosnia and Herzegovina (2008) 8 6 7 10 31
EU - Serbia (2008) 11 10 7 8 36
EU - Central America (2012) 8 6 14 13 41
EU - Georgia (2014) 9 7 16 15 47
EU - Moldova (2014) 10 6 16 14 46
EU - Ukraine (2014) 9 8 15 15 47
Mean 7.3 6.9 9.0 7.4 30.6
Non-Association Agreements
EU - Switzerland - Liechtenstein (1972) 2 2 3 2 9
EU - Norway (1973) 2 2 3 2 9
EU - Syria (1977) 2 2 3 2 9
EU - Andorra (1991) 2 2 2 2 8
EU - San Marino (1991) 0 0 3 3 6
EU - Faroe Islands (1996) 2 2 2 2 8
EU - Mexico (1997) 2 2 2 2 8
EU - CARIFORUM (2008) 3 3 15 15 36
EU - Côte d’Ivoire (2008) 4 6 4 4 18
EU - Pacific (2009) 3 2 4 4 13
EU - South Korea (2010) 4 4 16 15 39
EU - Colombia/Ecuador/Peru (2012) 4 4 17 16 41
EU - Canada (2016) 5 5 18 17 45
EU - Southern African Development Community (2016) 3 2 6 6 17
EU - Japan (2018) 10 4 15 17 46
EU - Singapore (2018) 3 4 14 14 35
EU - Vietnam (2019) 4 5 18 16 43
Mean 3.2 3.0 8.5 8.2 22.9
Notes: Authors’ elaboration based on Lechner (2016).
In what follows, we provide more details about the heterogeneity in the coverage of political
and economic NTPOs, respectively, in EU trade agreements.
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Political NTPOs
As mentioned before, EU trade agreements cover NTPOs of a political nature, which encompass
provisions related to civil and political rights (e.g. human rights, democracy, and the rule of
law) and to security and peace (e.g. non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating
terrorism, organized crime and corruption).
Human rights, democracy, and the rule of law are systematically considered as “essential ele-
ments” of EU trade agreements since 1995. The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) also constitutes an “essential element” of EU trade agreements since 2003, but on a less
systematic basis.12
The “essential elements” clause is usually divided in two provisions. The first one presents the
scope of the clause, describing the principles that the parties engage to abide by (e.g. human rights,
democracy, the rule of law, non-proliferation of WMD). The second provision enables one party to
take “appropriate measures” in case the other party violates the “essential elements” clause. The
measures introduced should be proportional to the violation and priority should be given to the ones
that least disturb the normal operation of the agreement. However, in the case of a material breach
– which consists of either the repudiation of the agreement not sanctioned by the general rules of
international law or a particularly serious and substantial violation of an “essential element” – the
agreement can be terminated or suspended in whole or in part, based on Article 60 of the Vienna
Convention. In certain agreements, the parties can also rely on the dispute settlement mechanism
of the agreement to solve the issues that arise from the violation of the “essential elements” clause.
The political nature of civil and political rights and peace and security issues is apparent from
the way in which they are included in trade agreements. In the case of association agreements,
where the political dialogue is joint with the trade agreement, the “essential elements” clauses are
usually mentioned in the general principles and/or in the political dialogue section and apply to
the whole agreement. Non-association agreements do not include the “essential elements” clauses,
but simply refer to the principles and values from the separate framework agreements.13
12For instance, the agreements with countries from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership such as Egypt, Lebanon,
and Algeria, renegotiated after 2003, do not incorporate the non-proliferation of WMD clause.
13For example, the FTA with Korea refers to the EU-South Korea Framework Agreement, while the EU-Canada
FTA is framed within a Strategic Partnership Agreement. Cotonou, the umbrella agreement for the set of economic
partnership agreements (EPAs) with ACP countries, is a special case. It is commonly classified as an association
agreement (its legal basis is Article 217); however, the EPAs have not been concluded with a view to association, which
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Table ?? reveals that civil and political rights and security issues are much more important in
association agreements compared to non-association agreements. The average legalization scores of
civil and political rights in association agreements is more than double than that of non-association
agreements (7.3 versus 3.2). The same is true for security issues, which are characterized by an
average legalization of 6.9 in association agreements and 3.0 in non-association agreements.
This distinction is further elucidated in Figure ??, in which we correlate the political legaliza-
tion scores of association agreements (indicated with black dots) and other EU trade agreements
(indicated with white squares) with the market size (log of GDP) of the trading partner.14 The
left-hand-side panel focuses on civil and political rights, while the right-hand-side panel looks at
security issues.
Figure 2
Coverage of Political NTPOs in EU Trade Agreements and the Size of EU Trading Partners
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the legalization scores from Lechner (2016) and GDP in
constant 2010 US$ from the World Development Indicators dataset of the World Bank.
Both panels of Figure ?? show that legalization scores of political NTPOs are negatively corre-
is why we do not list them under association agreements. Moreover, the “essential elements” clause of the Cotonou
agreement refers to the potential suspension of development cooperation and aid, i.e. non-trade policy sanctions. See
also footnote ?? below.
14The data on GDP of the EU’s trading partners (in constant 2010 US$) are taken from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators database.
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lated with market size of the agreement partner and this inverse relationship is driven by association
agreements (clustered at the top left corner of each panel). This suggests that, when negotiating
these agreements, the EU offers to small neighboring countries preferential access to its market in
exchange for political cooperation and alignment.
Economic NTPOs
Economic NTPOs related to economic and social rights and environmental protection are usually
bundled together under the umbrella of “trade and sustainable development” (TSD).15 Both asso-
ciation and non-association agreements concluded after the Treaty of Lisbon include TSD chapters.
However, unlike political NTPOs, economic NTPOs do not currently constitute “essential elements”
of EU trade agreements. This may change, though, due to the increasing significance of environmen-
tal policy. Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis, EU Commissioner for Trade, has recently
suggested that the “Commission will propose the respect of the Paris climate commitments as an
essential element in our future agreements.”16
Table ?? shows that the legalization scores of economic and social rights and environmental
protection are comparable between association and non-association agreements.17
Similarly to political NTPOs, the size of the trading partner is key to explaining the heterogene-
ity in the coverage of economic NTPOs across trade agreements. However, in the case of economic
NTPOs, the relationship is positive. This can be seen from Figure ??, in which we correlate the
legalization scores of economic and social rights (left panel) and environmental protection (right
panel) with the market size of the agreement partner. These results suggest that commercial mo-
tives are behind the inclusion of economic NTPOs in trade agreements: when negotiating with
15TSD chapters include “substantive standards,” meaning that there are minimum requirements for both parties
to implement certain multilateral obligations (Harrison et al., 2018). In the case of economic and social rights,
these minimum obligations refer to the ILO core labor standards, which are already binding on the parties due to
their membership of the ILO. When it comes to environmental standards, the obligation to implement multilateral
environmental agreements is essentially a reaffirmation of obligations already binding on the parties under those
agreements. These provisions are not new to any party (Bartels, 2013). Second, TSD chapters include “procedural
commitments,” through which the parties engage in dialogue and cooperation. Moreover, they commit to transparency
when introducing new standards and agree to monitor and review the impact of the agreement. The parties also agree
not to undermine their existing labor and environmental standards and to seek to enhance the existing regulations
(Harrison et al., 2018). Finally, the implementation of TSD chapters is managed through various “institutional
mechanisms,” including committees of state/EU officials, as described by Harrison et al. (2018).
16EVP Dombrovskis, Opening Statement at European Parliament Hearing, Brussels, 2nd October 2020.
17The average legalization of economic and social rights in association agreements is 9.0 and in non-association
agreements is 8.5. The same is true for environmental protection aspects, which are characterized by an average
legalization of 7.4 in association agreements and 8.2 in non-association agreements.
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larger trading partners, the EU pushes for higher labor and environmental standard to ensure a
“level playing field” between domestic producers and their foreign competitors.
Figure 3
Coverage of Economic NTPOs in EU Trade Agreements and the Size of EU Trading Partners
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the legalization scores from Lechner (2016) and GDP in
constant 2010 US$ from the World Development Indicators dataset of the World Bank.
3 NTPOs in the EU’s Generalized Systems of Preferences
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is an alternative policy tool through which the EU
can grant preferential access to its market. In this section, we first describe briefly the evolution of
EU GSP schemes before discussing in detail their coverage of NTPOs.
3.1 EU GSP schemes
The legal basis for GSP schemes in the GATT/WTO system is the Enabling Clause of 1979.18
This clause legalizes a positive, pro-development form of trade discrimination, as it allows donor
18Formally, this is a decision adopted by GATT contracting parties on 28 November 1979 for the Differential and
More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries. The idea of granting
non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferential market access to developing countries through GSP programs
was first introduced in the late 1960’s. The broad objectives were to increase participation of developing countries
in international trade, foster their export earnings, promote their industrialization, and accelerate their economic
growth (UNCTAD, 1968).
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countries to offer better than most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariffs to developing countries without
extending the same treatment to developed trade partners. The vague formulation of the Enabling
Clause, in terms of countries and goods that should be eligible for preferences, allowed for a great
deal of discretion on the side of preference-granting countries (Ornelas, 2016), which often use GSP
programs for their own political objectives (Grossman and Sykes, 2005).
Most developed countries have set up their own GSP regimes.19 Due to the unilateral nature
of these programs, the EU and other granting countries can limit the set of beneficiary countries
and/or the product coverage of their GSP schemes, respectively. For example, products such as
clothing and footwear, which are considered sensitive on the part of donor countries and raise
concerns among import-competing firms, are either excluded from the list of beneficiary sectors or
receive lower trade preferences.
The EU’s approach to its GSP scheme has evolved considerably over time, through three main
reforms enacted in 1995, 2006 and 2014.20 These reforms were aimed at rendering the scheme more
predictable, stable, and targeted towards those countries most in need. As of today, the EU is
operating three GSP programs, which each grants different levels of access to the EU market: GSP,
GSP+, and EBA. Table ?? in the Appendix lists the current members of these programs.
The first is the standard GSP program, which is currently offered to 15 beneficiary countries,
falling into the categories of low and lower-middle income countries as defined by the World Bank.
Membership to the standard GSP program of the EU has changed considerably over time and is
now at its lowest since the launch of the program. Countries in the standard EU GSP program
benefit from lower than MFN tariff treatment or zero import duties on about 66% of the tariff lines
applied by the EU.
The second program is denoted as GSP+ and allows duty free imports of the vast majority of
the products covered by the standard GSP.21 The GSP+ program was introduced in 2006 and has
currently eight members that have been considered eligible on the basis of their economic vulner-
19Before the adoption of the Enabling Clause, in order to temporarily legalize GSP programs, in 1971 the GATT
contracting parties agreed to grant a 10-year waiver of Article I – the (MFN) non-discrimination obligation, for the
GSP programs.
20These reforms were respectively introduced by regulations published in 1994 (European Union, 1994), 2005
(European Union, 2005) and 2012 (European Union, 2012).
21The share of tariff lines eligible for the duty-free GSP+ treatment is virtually the same as that for standard GSP
(66%), with the difference that about 50% of standard GSP tariffs, although lower than MFN, do not go to zero
(Ornelas, 2016).
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ability (European Union, 2012).22 As discussed below, beneficiaries under the GSP+ are granted
additional preferences relative to standard GSP members in exchange for complying with a num-
ber of international conventions protecting human rights, the environment, and good governance.
Table ?? in the Appendix provides a list of these conventions.
Finally, the Everything-but-Arms (EBA) initiative introduced in 2001 grants the most far-
reaching preferential treatment as it allows for duty-free imports of all products exported by the
48 Least Developed Countries (LDCs)23 with the exception of arms and ammunitions.24
3.2 NTPOs in EU GSP Schemes
Over the years, the EU has introduced in its GSP regulations several provisions aimed at pursuing
NTPOs, making preferential access to its market conditional on compliance with these objectives.
Table ?? summarizes the main reforms of the EU’s GSP schemes and the gradual expansion of
NTPOs in these schemes.
Table 2
Evolution of provisions related to NTPOs in the GSP Programs of the EU
1991 1998 2006
Arrangements with Drugs arrangement Drugs arrangement Special Incentive
conditionality provisions Arrangement for
in GSP regulations Special Incentive Sustainable Development
Arrangements concerning and Good Governance
Labor Rights and Environmental Protection
NTPO areas concerned Security Security Security
Economic and social rights Economic and social rights
Environmental protection Environmental protection
Civil and political rights
One of the earliest examples in 1991 concerned security issues (European Union, 1990). To
discourage the production of narcotic drugs and to stimulate planting of substitute crops, the EU
granted additional trade preferences, in form of duty-free market access, to Bolivia, Colombia,
22Vulnerability of the beneficiary country is defined in terms of its size (the country’s EU import share of total
GSP imports must be less than 1%) and diversification of export portfolio (the share of the five largest sectors in
total GSP exports must be larger than 75%). The vulnerability definition was eased in the 2014 reform: the size
threshold was increased from 1% to 2% (it has further been increased to 6.5% in 2015) and diversification is now
computed based on the seven largest sectors in total GSP exports.
23The identification of LDCs follows the long-standing UN definition, which is based on the three main criteria of
income, human assets and economic vulnerability. The group of LDCs has been very stable over time, with the last
country to leave the group being Samoa in 2019.
24Only imports of fresh bananas, rice and sugar were not fully liberalized immediately. Tariff restrictions were
removed in 2006 for bananas and in 2009 for sugar and rice.
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Ecuador, and Peru. In the following years, the EU expanded what was called the “drugs ar-
rangement” to Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela,
justifying the extended preferential treatment granted to these additional countries with the in-
tention of combatting not only the production but also the trafficking of drugs (European Union,
1991).
The EU used the 1995 GSP reform to add further NTPOs to its GSP regulation, through two
Special Incentive Arrangements addressing labor and environmental issues.25 The first Arrange-
ment was comprised of a set of provisions granting an additional preferential margin to beneficiaries
that could prove to have adopted and applied domestically the International Labor Organization
(ILO) conventions concerning the freedom of association, the protection of the right to organize
and bargain collectively, and the convention concerning the minimum age for employment.26
The second arrangement made available additional trade preferences to countries adhering to
environmental standards laid down by the International Tropic Timber Organization (ITTO) relat-
ing to the sustainable management of forests (European Union, 1994). To obtain these additional
trade preferences, written applications needed to be made to the European Commission (EC),
with details about the domestic legislation incorporating the conventions and the measures taken
to monitor their application. The EC could then decide whether to grant the trade preferences
included in the Special Incentive Arrangement to the applicant country as a whole, or only to some
sectors, if it considered that the conventions were effectively applied. Applications for the labor
standards arrangement were filed by Georgia, Mongolia, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Sri Lanka
and Moldova, but only the latter two countries were granted preferences.
In 2001, the addition of Pakistan to the drugs arrangement triggered the first reaction at the
WTO about the discriminatory nature (amongst developing countries) of NTPO-related provisions
in the EU GSP programs. India filed a complaint, which resulted in certain aspects of the “drugs
arrangement” being ruled to be WTO-inconsistent in the Appellate Body EC-Tariff Preferences
report (Appellate Body, 2004).27 The response of the EU was to rearrange all the NTPO provisions
25Although the intention of introducing the Special Incentive Arrangement concerning labor rights and environ-
mental protection appeared for the first time in the 1995 GSP reform (European Union, 1994), these arrangement
were fully developed and applied only by the 1998 GSP Regulation (European Union, 1998).
26ILO conventions 87, 98 and 138.
27Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing
Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2004, DSR 2004: III, 925.
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related to drugs, labor and environmental provisions into the Special Arrangement for Sustainable
Development and Good Governance, also known as GSP+, a single arrangement treating jointly
all the NTPOs in the GSP, which was introduced with the 2006 GSP reform.28
Under GSP+, the EU offers duty-free market access on virtually all GSP eligible products to
eligible countries that have ratified and applied a list of 27 international conventions on sustainable
development and good governance. These 27 conventions broaden and deepen the range of NTPOs
addressed in earlier GSP programs of the EU. Human rights and corruption were added to the areas
covered by the previous scheme, and a great deal of additional provisions were included concerning
labor rights, environmental protection, and security issues.29
In its initial (2006) formulation, the list of 27 conventions was divided in two sub-lists of core
and non-core conventions. GSP+ applicants needed to have ratified all of the 15 core conventions,
relating to human and labor rights, and at least seven other conventions relating to environmental
protection, drug production and trafficking. In addition, countries needed to commit to having
ratified all remaining conventions by 2008. This ratification requirement was amended in the 2009
version of the GSP+, which imposed the ratification of the entire set of 27 international conventions
in order for a country to be eligible for GSP+ preferences. Importantly, similarly to the Special
Incentive Arrangements in force pre-2006, GSP+ applicants need to maintain implementation of
the conventions and accept regular monitoring and review of the status of such implementation
(European Union, 2005, 2013a).
In 2006 the GSP+ scheme was offered for three years, and it was renewed in 2009 and 2014,
with the latter reform setting the rules which currently apply until 2023. From the outset, fifteen
countries joined the GSP+: the eleven original members of the drugs arrangement excluding Pak-
istan,30 plus Moldova, Mongolia, Sri Lanka and Georgia. In 2009, all GSP+ members re-applied for
the scheme, except Panama, which failed to apply in time,31 and Moldova, which had left the GSP
program entirely because of signing a trade agreement with the EU. In addition, Armenia, Azer-
baijan and Paraguay joined the list of beneficiaries (European Union, 2008). In 2014, Colombia,
28The WTO legality of the GSP+ program is a widely debated topic in the international law literature. For an
overview of the legal issues concerning the GSP+ see Bartels (2003, 2007), Jayasinghe (2015), Kishore (2017).
29The security issues in GSP+ relate to corruption and illicit drugs.
30Pakistan joined the GSP+ in 2014, after the GSP reform that raised the vulnerability import-share threshold to
2%.
31Panama re-joined the GSP+ scheme at the next available date, in 2014.
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Honduras and Nicaragua did not re-apply for the GSP+ scheme.
The 2014 GSP reform altered the eligibility criteria in the GSP+ scheme (European Union, 2012,
2014b), and also established that countries that have become part of alternative preferential trade
agreements with the EU would lose their GSP benefits. For this latter reason, Costa Rica, Panama,
Peru and El Salvador were excluded from the GSP+ program in 2016 (European Union, 2014a)
and Georgia in 2017 (European Union, 2015). Other countries instead joined the GSP+ scheme:
Cape Verde and Pakistan in 2014, the Philippines in 2015, and Kyrgyzstan in 2016 (European
Union, 2014c, 2016). Finally, Azerbaijan and Ecuador graduated from the GSP scheme altogether
because they were classified as upper-middle income countries for three consecutive years by the
World Bank.32
4 Can Trade Conditionality Promote NTPOs?
As shown in previous sections, the EU has attempted over the past few decades to use its trade
policy instruments to pursue various NTPOs, such as the fulfillment of social norms and the respect
of environmental standards (Koch, 2015).
In this section, we discuss whether the EU can promote NTPOs in its trading partners through
positive and negative conditionality in its trade agreements and GSP schemes. According to Koch
(2015), conditionality can be classified based on the leverage mechanism, which can be both punitive
(negative) or rewarding (positive). Negative conditionality is related to the reduction, suspension
or termination of benefits when the conditions are not met within a relationship. Positive condi-
tionality involves meeting requirements as a precondition for entering into a new relationship or
granting additional benefits based upon performance or reform within an established relationship.
4.1 Conditionality in EU Trade Agreements
In this section, we discuss the extent to which the EU can use tariff preferences in trade agreements
as a carrot-and-stick mechanism to promote NTPOs in its trading partners. Evidently, there is a
range of other policies through which the EU can pursue NTPOs, particularly in its association
32This mechanism is known as ‘income graduation’, and applies to all the members across the three EU GSP
schemes.
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agreements.33 However, the reward offered for “good behavior” and the punishment inflicted for
“bad behavior” do not involve trade policy (tariff preferences), but non-trade related policies (e.g.
financial assistance, technical co-operation programs, prospects for EU membership), which are
beyond the scope of this article.
As mentioned before, preferential trade agreements covering goods are regulated by GATT
Article XXIV. All EU trade agreements are negotiated under this multilateral rule, which imply
that trading partners have to “eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce with
respect to substantially all trade in products originating in the constituents of the agreement.” As
a result, positive conditionality through tariff preferences is very limited: once an agreement had
entered into force and the tariffs on “substantially all” trade have been eliminated, the EU cannot
easily use trade preferences as a “carrot” to incentivize trading partners’ respect of NTPOs. The
only option is to extend preferences to cover excluded products. These products are typically those
considered ‘sensitive’, so eliminating tariffs on them may be economically and politically costly for
the EU.
It should be stressed that the EU could have some leverage before the entry into force of trade
agreements, when it can decide not to pursue trade negotiations with countries that violate NTPOs.
This could induce some countries to improve their domestic policies in order to be considered as
potential partners in a trade agreement with the EU. However, the negotiations of the FTA with
Singapore suggests that, when deciding whether to negotiate a trade agreement, the commercial
interests of the EU may prevail over the pursuit of NTPOs. Singapore did not accept to sign an
agreement that would have required a change in its position regarding the death penalty, human
rights, or governance. The EU thus took a weaker stance on these issues, recognizing Singapore’s
human rights practices through a side letter to the agreement. Meissner and McKenzie (2018)
argue that, in the case of the EU-Singapore agreement, the pure commercial interests of the EU
prevailed over the promotion of its NTPOs. McKenzie and Meissner (2020) point out that the case
of the negotiations with Singapore “demonstrates the significant challenge the EU faces in fulfilling
its strategic objectives and maintaining both its coherence and legitimacy as a political and trade
33For example, the agreements with the Western Balkans countries (e.g. Serbia, Montenegro, Albania), as well as
those with Eastern (e.g. Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine) and Southern (e.g. Morocco, Egypt, Jordan) neighbors contain
important packages related to financial assistance and technical cooperation, which support reforms in areas of good
governance, democracy, the rule of law, security, and sustainable development.
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actor as it negotiates trade agreements” (p. 3).
Negative conditionality appears to be a more prominent feature of EU trade agreements. As
previously stated, the “essential elements” clause included provides a mechanism through which the
EU could sanction its trading partners. However, the EU has never actually used trade preferences
to punish violations of NTPOs.34
Several factors limit the ability of the EU to punish violations of NTPOs by its agreement
partners. First, the “essential elements” clause only covers political NTPOs (civil and political
rights as well as security issues). Since the TSD provisions are not defined as “essential elements,”
a violation of labor and/or environmental provisions could not justify the suspension or termination
of the agreement in the event of a breach.35
Second, triggering the “essential elements” clause could entail significant commercial costs for
the EU, particularly in the case of FTAs with large trading partners. Suspending or terminating
these reciprocal trade agreements would increase both the cost of importing from and exporting to
the FTA partner.
Third, since trading partners are at least formally on an equal footing, it is difficult to imagine
that one of them could accept monitoring of its NTPOs from a peer. For instance, monitoring
the respect of human rights does not involve habilitated organs to oversee the implementation of
the various clauses (Bartels, 2013). Concerning the TSD chapters, monitoring involves several
specialized bodies and tools that require input from civil society groups, but there are concerns
regarding their engagement and power to address non-compliance with labor and environmental
objectives (Marx et al., 2016).36
34The “essential elements” clause has been invoked very rarely, even though there have been many instances
in which the EU’s trading partners have blatantly violated human rights (Beke et al., 2014). This happened in the
context of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement with ACP countries, following coups, flawed elections, or grave human
rights violations (Hachez, 2015). Even in these rare occasions, the EU did not lift tariff preferences to punish the
trading partners, but instead suspended technical co-operation programs.
35With respect to economic NTPOs (economic and social rights, environmental protection), the TSD chapters “are
not primarily designed as a form of conditionality but rather as a safeguard to ensure that trade liberalization does
not lead to deregulation or to the erosion of labor rights or environmental standards” (Portela, 2018). The resolution
of issues related to sustainable development is based on non-sanction procedures. Hence, the main value added of
TSD chapters is to enhance dialogue and cooperation in order to attain sustainable trade objectives. This approach
to sustainable development in EU trade agreements, based on dialogue- and cooperation-based solutions in case of
violations, has been considered “as lacking the necessary vigor” (Marx et al., 2016, p. 16).
36As discussed by Bronckers and Gruni (2019), the European Commission launched discussions with a trading
partner that had failed to respect labor standards in December 2018 in the context of the EU-Korea FTA. A panel
has been requested seven years after South Korea had failed to ratify and implement four of the eight fundamental ILO
Conventions. However, since labor standards are excluded from the dispute settlement procedures of the agreement,
no sanctions have been applied. Bronckers and Gruni (2019) discuss different ways through which the EU could
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Finally, if the EU did increase tariffs vis-à-vis an agreement partner, this policy may be chal-
lenged at the WTO. The EU could invoke the Vienna Convention to justify triggering the “essential
elements” clause of the trade agreement. However, WTO jurisprudence on GATT Article XXIV,
and in particular the Appellate Body ruling in Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and
Clothing Products, suggests that if the EU raised tariffs towards a partner country on the ground
that it did not respect democratic principles and human rights, this policy might not be considered
“necessary” for the functioning of the agreement (Mavroidis, 2016).
4.2 Conditionality in the EU GSP schemes
In this section we examine whether EU GSP schemes can provide a “carrot-and-stick” mechanism to
reward “good behavior” and punish “bad behavior” in regard to NTPOs in developing countries.
Our goal is thus to assess whether the EU’s GSP system could be an effective tool to promote
NTPOs in developing countries. This is different from assessing the effectiveness of its application
so far, which is the focus of several earlier studies (Beke and Hachez, 2015; Orbie and Tortell, 2009;
Velluti, 2016).37
Positive conditionality provisions abound in the EU’s GSP schemes. Since the introduction of
the first NTPO elements in its GSP regulations, the EU has always offered incentives to countries
that comply with non-trade objectives, by way of a more preferential tariff treatment.
In the “drugs arrangement” of 1991 the EU offered duty-free market access to compliant coun-
tries, thereby deepening the preferences that they had already obtained as GSP members. These
extra trade preferences, however, were perceived as discriminatory among developing countries and
as running counter to the principles established in the Enabling Clause. The WTO Appellate Body
held that the “drugs arrangement” was offered to a hand-picked list of beneficiaries, and did not
establish any objective criteria that, if met, would have allowed other developing countries to be
improve the enforcement of TSD chapters in its trade agreements.
37The assessment of whether conditionality in GSP preferences can bring about meaningful improvements in human
and labor rights conditions remains difficult, and is not the focus of our analysis. A few studies have examined the
impact of the sanctions imposed by the EU on GSP recipients. These studies suggest that the sanctions had limited
impact on Myanmar and Belarus (Gnutzmann and Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, 2017; Zhou and Cuyvers, 2011). Sri
Lanka, by contrast, was more severely affected, since its exports to the EU were concentrated in sectors like the
garment industry, which were more dependent on GSP preferences (Bandara and Naranpanawa, 2015). From a
human and labor rights perspective, the three countries subject to EU sanctions did initially little to remedy the
violations reported (Zamfir, 2018). Over time, however, Myanmar and Sri Lanka underwent a regime change, which
led to the re-establishment of GSP and GSP+ preferences.
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included as beneficiaries of the arrangement (Appellate Body, 2004).
The two “Special Incentive Arrangements” introduced into the GSP regulation in 1995 also
offered deeper-than-GSP trade preferences, in exchange for applying three ILO conventions on
labor rights and adhering to certain environmental standards. In order to benefit from this form
of conditionality, however, developing countries needed apply for it, which was unlike the “drugs
arrangement” whose members were selected by the EU.
The current and most complete instrument through which the EU applies positive condition-
ality is its GSP+ scheme. The GSP+ covers all the NTPOs jointly under the general concept
of “sustainable development and good governance” and offers developing countries lower tariffs in
exchange for compliance with NTPOs.38 To join the GSP+ scheme, developing countries must
apply to the European Commission, which evaluates whether the applicant has ratified and applied
the 27 international conventions.39
Within the boundaries of WTO case law on non-discrimination amongst GSP beneficiaries, the
EU GSP schemes thus provide ample leeway to reward developing countries that make efforts on
NTPOs, which can gain better access to the EU market.
Negative conditionality is also pervasive and affects all three GSP programs (standard GSP,
EBA, as well as GSP+), as the EU can withdraw GSP preferences from beneficiaries in case of
violations of NTPOs.40
A country might lose its standard GSP, GSP+ or EBA preferences for all or certain products
either (i) following serious and systemic violation of the principles laid down in the ‘core conventions’
(Part A of Table ?? in Appendix B), which are used as a basis for GSP+; or (ii) if a country exported
products made by prison labor; or (iii) in case of serious shortcomings in custom controls on the
38The GSP+ scheme has been considered problematic in light of the Enabling Clause (Jayasinghe, 2015), since it
seems to go against the idea that, when offering GSP preferences, “developed countries do not expect reciprocity, [they]
do not expect developing countries, in the course of trade negotiations, to make contributions which are inconsistent
with their individual development, financial and trade needs.” However, the legality of the GSP+ program has not
yet been challenged.
39Most of the early GSP+ members had ratified all of the core conventions before the creation of GSP+ in 2006
(Azerbaijan, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay and Peru had ratified all of the 27 conventions by 2005), with only a few
ratifications around the accession date. Countries that joined the GSP+ at a later stage had ratified all the necessary
conventions long before becoming GSP+ members.
40There are also negative conditionality provisions that are unrelated to NTPOs. For example, GSP preferences
can be lost: (a) in case of fraud, serious and systematic unfair trading practices (this provision will not apply for those
products which are already subject to anti-dumping or countervailing measures) irregularities or failure to comply
with the rules of origin, failure to provide administrative cooperation for the implementation and control of the GSP
arrangements; (b) in case of serious and systematic infringements of the objectives adopted by Regional Fishery
Organizations, or any arrangements concerning the conservations and management of fishery resources.
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export and transit of (illicit) drugs, or failures in compliance with international conventions on
anti-terrorism and money-laundering.41
With reference to point (i), recall from Section ?? that GSP+ members are required to have
ratified and applied 27 international conventions when they join the program, including the core
conventions related to human and labor rights. The same requirement does not apply to benefi-
ciaries of the standard GSP and EBA programs. However, if a member of any of the three GSP
programs violates the core conventions, the EU can revoke its tariff preferences.42
If a violation is reported, the EU Commission carries out an investigation, consults the benefi-
ciary concerned and can eventually decide to suspend GSP preferences. Preference withdrawal is
therefore a gradual process and is meant to allow the country to possibly remedy the alleged vio-
lation. If a decision about a suspension of preferences is finally made, it is initially for six months,
after which the EU decides to either terminate or extend the suspension (European Union, 2012).
In addition to the aforementioned provisions, the GSP+ program has specific negative condi-
tionality provisions. Within this program, the EU regularly monitors the status of implementation
of the conventions by examining the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring
bodies established under those conventions (European Union, 2012).43 GSP+ preferences can be
revoked if a country fails to ratify the necessary conventions, or to effectively implement them.
To the best of our knowledge, there have only been five instances in which the EU has sanctioned
NTPO violations by GSP recipients. These are summarized in Table ??.44
There have been two cases of suspension of preferences granted under the standard GSP scheme,
both occurring because of violations of labor standards. These cases concern Myanmar (currently
an EBA member, but a GSP member at the time the sanction occurred) and Belarus (a standard
GSP member). The EU sanctioned Myanmar in 1997, because of its use of forced labor, and then
41The antiterrorism provision was introduced in the 2014 reform (European Union, 2012).
42To sanction a member of the standard GSP and EBA programs, the country in question must have independently
ratified the relevant convention(s) and thus be bound by their principles. For example, in 1998 the EU contemplated
GSP sanctions against Pakistan for using child labor, but ultimately decided against it because Pakistan had not yet
ratified the child labor conventions and was thus not bound by them (Portela and Orbie, 2014).
43This monitoring activity leads to a report, presented every two years by the European Commission to the EU
Parliament and the EU Council.
44On three other occasions, the EU Commission launched an investigation, but did not withdraw the GSP prefer-
ences from the countries concerned. In 1998 the EU investigated Pakistan over its alleged use of child labor, in 2008
El Salvador was investigated over its compliance with the ILO Convention on freedom of association, and in 2012
Bolivia was investigated over the alleged failure to implement the UN Convention on Narcotic Drugs (Portela and
Orbie, 2014; Zamfir, 2018).
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re-admitted the country into the GSP program in 2013 (European Union, 2013b). The sanction for
Belarus occurred in 2007, as a consequence of the country’s non-compliance with the Convention
on freedom of assembly and collective bargaining (European Union, 2006).45
Table 3
EU sanctions following NTPO violations by GSP beneficiaries
Year Member Violated NTPO Sanction
1997 Myanmar Use of forced labor Suspension of GSP preferences
2007 Belarus Freedom of association and right of collective barganining Suspension of GSP preferences
2010 Sri Lanka Civil and political political rights, rights of the child Suspension of GSP+ preferences
2010 Venezuela Failed to ratify the UN convention against corruption Suspension of GSP+ preferences
2020 Cambodia Civil and political political rights Partial suspension of EBA preferences
Among GSP+ members, in 2010 Sri Lanka and Venezuela were “downgraded” from GSP+ to
standard GSP preferences. Sri Lanka was suspended from 2010 to 2017, because of its failure to
implement effectively some of the conventions (European Union, 2009, 2010, 2017).46 Venezuela
has still not re-gained GSP status, due to its failure to ratify the UN convention against corruption.
Cambodia is the only country so far that has been suspended from EBA preferences. In February
2020, the EU decided to withdraw Cambodia’s tariff preferences, due to serious and systematic
violations of principles laid down in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
At the same time, to mitigate the socio-economic impacts of the preference withdrawal, and in
consideration of the development needs of the country, the EU decided to remove tariff preferences
only on certain products originating from Cambodia (EU Commission, 2020).
It can be argued that the EU should have applied negative conditionality on more occasions
and towards more GSP recipients. Indeed, European Commission (2017) reports many instances
of “non-compliance on the ground,” including violations of human and labor rights reported in
Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, and Russia, which failed to trigger the
negative conditionality provisions.
The EU usually justifies its limited use of negative conditionality with its policy of refraining
from measures that can be harmful to a target population (Bartels, 2008; EU Council, 2012). A
45Belarus’ sanction implied a fall back on standard non-preferential tariffs, as the country is not a WTO member and
therefore not even entitled to WTO MFN treatment. Currently Belarus is no longer eligible for EU GSP preferences.
46The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
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less altruistic explanation is linked to the commercial costs of punishing NTPO violations. Indeed,
the EU has only applied negative GSP conditionality on small developing countries (e.g. Sri Lanka
or Cambodia). When the violations have occurred in large developing countries (e.g. Pakistan or
China), it has refrained from increasing tariffs as a punishment, possibly because this would have
raised the cost of sourcing inputs from these countries, or for fear of retaliation in important export
markets.
5 Conclusion
The EU is a pivotal player in international trade relations and its Treaties stipulate that the EU’s
external actions be conducted in a way so as to promote European principles and values, such as
the respect for human rights and high labor and environmental standards.
In this paper, we have documented the coverage of NTPOs in the principal tools of EU trade
policy: its trade agreements (association and non-association ones) and GSP programs (standard
GSP, GSP+, and EBA). We have then examined the extent to which the EU could use these tools
as a carrot-and-stick mechanism to promote NTPOs in trading partners.
When examining the coverage of NTPOs across EU trade agreements, we show that political
NTPOs are more prevalent in agreements with smaller countries, and this result is mostly driven
by association agreements (see Figure ??). In line with previous studies (e.g. Limão, 2007), this
finding suggests that the EU enters these agreements to offer small neighbouring countries prefer-
ential access to its market, in exchange for political concessions (e.g. security cooperation, respect
of human rights and the rule of law). By contrast, economic NTPOs are more prevalent in trade
agreements with larger countries (see Figure ??). This suggests that, when negotiating these agree-
ments, the EU is mostly driven by commercial motives (improving access to the foreign markets,
while guaranteeing a level playing field between domestic and foreign producers).
Both political and economic NTPOs are included in the GSP programs through which the EU
offers preferential access to developing countries. In these programs, the EU’s approach to NTPOs
is more uniform than in the case of trade agreements. This may partly be due to the fact that
multilateral trade rules and WTO case law limit the ability of the EU to discriminate across GSP
beneficiaries.
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We then discuss the extent to which the EU can use trade policy conditionality to effectively
pursue NTPOs. Various studies have examined the enforceability of international agreements and
whether linking trade and non-trade policy objectives can help to achieve more cooperation overall
(Conconi and Perroni, 2002; Limão, 2005). These studies rely on the idea that trade policy can be
used as a carrot-and-stick mechanism to enforce commitments in other policy areas. We come to a
more nuanced conclusion. We argue that, within trade agreements, the EU cannot easily use trade
policy conditionality to achieve non-trade objectives. This is partly due to the fact that multilateral
trade rules limit the ability of the EU to reward trading partners (through lower tariffs) or punish
them (through higher tariffs), depending on their behavior in relation to NTPOs. Under GATT Ar-
ticle XXIV, preferential trade agreements must eliminate “substantially all” trade barriers amongst
the signatories. Although what constitutes “substantially all” trade is not precisely defined, neither
in legal texts nor in case law, this article limits by design both positive and negative conditionality.
As a result, once a trade agreement is concluded, it is difficult for the EU to use trade preferences
as a carrot-and-stick mechanism to promote NTPOs.
The EU can have some leverage with trading partners before the entry into force of a trade
agreement, since it can decide not to pursue negotiations with countries that violate NTPOs. At this
stage, there might be incentives for third countries to improve their domestic policies in order to be
considered as potential partners in a trade agreement with the EU. Some form of conditionality may
also be possible after the entry into force of the agreement. In case of serious violations of human
rights and security provisions, the EU could trigger the “essential elements” and take “appropriate
measures,” though it is legally unclear how much freedom the EU would have to increase tariffs
vis-à-vis its agreement partners. Finally, non-trade policies (e.g. financial assistance or technical
cooperation), which the EU can more easily offer to and take away from partner countries, may be
more effective at promoting NTPOs within trade agreements.
When it comes to trade preferences offered under GSP schemes, we argue that they are a more
flexible tool through which the EU could reward or punish trading partners in relation to NTPOs.
GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis and – except for EBA preferences – do not
extend to “substantially all trade.” The EU can thus reward countries that fulfil conditions related
to NTPOs by granting them better GSP preferences (lower tariffs, on more products). GSP benefits
can also be revoked, when trading partners do not fulfil these conditions. However, we point out
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that, if the EU wished to rely more on trade policy conditionality to promote such objectives, GSP
schemes should be administered in a more consistent and rules-based way, with beneficiary countries
being regularly monitored and their trade preferences being more systematically suspended or
revoked in case of non-compliance with their NTPO commitments.
The new EU Commission under President von der Leyen has promised to strengthen the use
of trade tools in support of NTPOs. Our paper suggests that commercial interests may inhibit
the full pursuit of NTPOs in EU trade policy. The negotiations of the agreement with Singapore
illustrate that the EU is at times willing to water down key values such as democracy, fundamental
rights, and the rule of law, in order to strike a commercial deal. Commercial interests also seem
to affect the implementation of NTPO conditionality in GSP programs: although there have been
many instances of severe violations of NTPOs in GSP beneficiaries, the EU has suspended trade
preferences on very few occasions in which the violations have occurred in small developing coun-
tries, exempting larger countries from similar sanctions. In line with previous studies, our analysis
suggests that EU trade policies reflect a tension between two often conflicting goals: promoting the
principles and values of the EU and pursuing its commercial interests.
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Appendix A. EU trade agreements
Table A-1
List of EU Trade Agreements Notified to the WTO
Trade Agreement Year of Current Status Type Part of an
signature (date of Association
application) Agreement
EU - Switzerland - Liechtenstein 1972 In force (1973) FTA No
EU - Iceland 1972 In force (1973) FTA No
EU - Norway 1973 In force (1973) FTA No
EU - Syria 1977 In force (1977) FTA No
EU - Andorra 1991 In force (1991) CU No
EU - San Marino 1991 In force (2002) CU No
European Economic Area (EEA) 1992 In force (1994) EIA Yes
EU - Turkey 1995 In force (1996) CU No
EU - Tunisia 1995 In force (1998) FTA Yes
EU - Israel 1995 In force (2000) FTA Yes
EU - Morocco 1996 In force (2000) FTA Yes
EU - Faroe Islands 1996 In force (1997) FTA No
EU - Palestinian Authority 1997 In force (1997) FTA Yes
EU - Jordan 1997 In force (2002) FTA Yes
EU - Mexico 1997 In force (2000) FTA & EIA No
EU - South Africa 1999 In force (2000) FTA Yes
EU - North Macedonia 2001 In force (2004) FTA & EIA Yes
EU - Egypt 2001 In force (2004) FTA Yes
EU - Algeria 2002 In force (2005) FTA Yes
EU - Lebanon 2002 In force (2003) FTA Yes
EU - Chile 2002 In force (2003) FTA & EIA Yes
EU - Albania 2006 In force (2009) FTA & EIA Yes
EU - Montenegro 2007 In force (2010) FTA & EIA Yes
EU - Serbia 2008 In force (2013) FTA & EIA Yes
EU - Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008 In force (2015) FTA & EIA Yes
EU - CARIFORUM 2008 Provisionally applied (2008) FTA & EIA No
EU - Côte d’Ivoire 2008 Provisionally applied (2016) FTA No
EU - Cameroon 2009 Provisionally applied (2014) FTA No
EU - Pacific 2009 Provisionally applied (2009) FTA No
EU - Eastern And Southern Africa 2009 Provisionally applied (2012) FTA No
EU - South Korea 2010 In force (2015) FTA & EIA No
EU - Colombia/Ecuador/Peru 2012 Provisionally applied (2013) FTA & EIA No
EU - Central America 2012 Provisionally applied (2013) FTA & EIA Yes
EU - Georgia 2014 In force (2016) FTA & EIA Yes
EU - Moldova 2014 In force (2016) FTA & EIA Yes
EU - Ukraine 2014 In force (2017) FTA & EIA Yes
EU - Southern African Development Community 2016 Provisionally applied (2016) FTA No
EU - Ghana 2016 Provisionally applied (2016) FTA No
EU - Canada 2016 Provisionally applied (2017) FTA & EIA No
EU - Japan 2018 In force (2019) FTA & EIA No
EU - Singapore 2018 In force (2019) FTA & EIA No
EU - Vietnam 2019 In force (2020) FTA & EIA No
Notes: Authors’ elaboration based on the information available at: http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicSearchByMemberResult.aspx?MemberCode=918&
lang=1&redirect=1 and https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/#_in-place. Source consulted




List of GSP members
Standard GSP GSP+ EBA
Congo Armenia Afghanistan Madagascar
Cook Islands Bolivia Angola Malawi
India Cabo Verde Bangladesh Mali
Indonesia Kyrgyz Republic Benin Mauritania
Kenya Mongolia Bhutan Mozambique
Micronesia Pakistan Burkina Faso Myanmar
Nauru Philippines Burundi Nepal
Nigeria Sri Lanka Cambodia Niger
Niue Central African Rep. Rwanda
Samoa Chad Sao Tome and Principe
Syria Comoros Senegal
Tajikistan Congo (Dem. Rep.) Sierra Leone
Tonga Djibouti Solomon Islands
Uzbekistan Equatorial Guinea Somalia










Note: Vietnam will continue to obtain GSP treatment in the EU over the two-year transition period following
the entry into force of the EU-Vietnam FTA. Nauru, Samoa, and Tonga will lose their GSP beneficiary status
from Jan 2021, due to being classified upper-middle income countries by the World Bank during three consecutive
years. Several countries will lose their EBA membership due to graduating from their LDC status over the next
years: Equatorial Guinea in 2021; Bhutan in 2026; Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands in 2027. Other
countries’ graduation from the LDC group will be fixed or recommended in 2021: Bangladesh, Laos, Myanmar,
Nepal, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu and Kiribati. Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU GSP regulations.
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Table B-2
List of conventions to be ratified to be eligible for GSP+
Part A - Core conventions related to human and labor rights (UN/ILO)
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Convention on the Rights of the Child
Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor, No. 29
Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, No. 87
Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, No. 98
Convention concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, No. 100
Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, No. 105
Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, No. 111
Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, No. 138
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, No. 182
Part B - Conventions related to the environment and to governance principles
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
Convention on Biological Diversity
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances
UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
UN Convention against Corruption
Note: Autors’ elaboration based on EU GSP regulations.
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